Status Offenders and Juvenile Court: A Proposal for Revamping Jurisdiction by Erlenbach, Kurt
Status Offenders and Juvenile Court:
A Proposal for Revamping Jurisdiction
Though the juvenile court is a relative newcomer to the American legal
system, the law's concern about misbehaving children is not.' As early as the
Revolution, states allowed children to be imprisoned2 and occasionally exe-
cuted3 in the name of the public order. Though much has changed since then,
juvenile jurisprudence is still far from settled, and the place of the status
offender is perhaps the most unsettled.
Part of the problem stems from the nature of "crimes" encompassed by
the juvenile system, that is, status offenses and delinquency. A "status
offense" is commonly understood to be an act that can be committed only by
a child, such as truancy, running away from home, or disobedience to par-
ents.4 Delinquency, on the other hand, contains an offense which would be a
crime if it were committed by an adult.5 For years juvenile courts treated the
two kinds of offenders in the same way, and many courts still do.
Largely in response to this, the Joint Institute of Judicial Administration/
American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Commission proposed
that status offense jurisdiction be eliminated 6 something that only one state
previously had done.7 Although the ABA House of Delegates refused to ac-
I. Garlock, "Wayward" Children and the Law, 1820-1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense Jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341 (1979).
2. See K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS-AMERICA'S INCARCERATED CHILDREN
24 (1976).
3. State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163 (1828) (affirmed a death sentence imposed on a twelve year old boy for
murder).
4. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022 (Page 1976) defines an "unruly child" (Ohio's term for a status
offender) as a child
(A) Who does not subject himself to the reasonable control of his parents, teachers, guardian, or
custodian, by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient;
(B) Who is a habitual truant from home or school;
(C) Who so deports himself as to injure or endanger the health or morals of himself or others;
(D) Who attempts to enter the marriage relationship in any state without the consent of his
parents ... ;
(E) Who is found in a disreputable place, visits or patronizes a place prohibited by law, or associates
with vagrant, vicious, criminal, notorious, or immoral persons;
(F) Who engages in an occupation prohibited by law, or is in a situation dangerous to life or limb or
injurious to the health or morals of himself or others;
(G) Who has violated any law applicable only to a child.
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02 (Page 1976) defines a delinquent child as a child "(A) Who violates
any law of this state.. . , which would be a crime if committed by an adult... ; [or] (B) Who violates any
lawful order of the court made under this chapter."
6. INSTITUTE OF JUDICAL ADMINISTRATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR § 1. 1 (Tentative Draft 1977)
[hereinafter cited as STANDARDS].
7. Juvenile courts in Utah have jurisdiction over delinquent offenders, neglected and dependent children,
truants from school, and children in the state industrial school. UTAH CODE ANN. § 9A:78-3a-16 (1977). A
disobedient child, or one who has run away from home, will be referred to juvenile court only after the *'earnest
and persistent efforts" of the division of family services prove unavailing. Id. § 9A:78-3a-16.5. This change was
made in 1977. 1977 UTAH LAWS 320. See State v. Dung Hung Vo, 585 P.2d 464 (Utah 1978).
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cept the proposal,8 the issues raised by the critics of status offense jurisdiction
burn as brightly as ever.
The elimination of status offense jurisdiction from the juvenile courts is
undoubtedly too radical a step for most state legislatures, and it may do more
harm than good. Retaining the present system, however, ignores the inequi-
ties inherent in it. This Comment addresses the problems raised by those
favoring abolition of the status offense jurisdiction,9 discusses two proposals
for change,' ° and offers a new proposal for revamping the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court."
I. THE PROBLEMS
Among the many complaints about the juvenile justice system, several
problems seem especially detrimental to its effectiveness. First, the system
shows a marked philosophical contradiction in its legal development. Second,
the status offender exists in a sort of constitutional limbo that often provides
only uncertain protection from state action. Finally, the juvenile system im-
plies distinctions about delinquents and status offenders that are neither em-
pirically supported nor legally consistent. Together, these criticisms present a
strong indictment of the present juvenile jurisdiction statutes.
A. The Schizophrenic Philosophy of the Juvenile Court
Juvenile courts were established to keep children out of adult criminal
courts. Thus, juvenile courts developed without the retributive features of
criminal court; the goal was to treat and cure the anti-social attitude of the
child 3 and otherwise act in his or her best interest. The equitable doctrine of
parens patriae4 was used to enforce this condition-related, as opposed to
behavior-related, philosophy.
The practical application of these principles led to the development of the
peculiar style of the juvenile court, a style that changed little until the 1960s.
The "proper" procedure for the turn-of-the-century juvenile court was
described in this way:
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know
that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time,
and more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and
8. CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER, Feb. 18, 1980, at 4, col. 2. The vote was 145 to 142. Id.
9. See text accompanying notes 12-96 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 97-111 infra.
1I. See text accompanying notes 112-14 infra.
12. See Garlock, "'Wayward" Children and the Law, 1820-1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense Juris-
diction of the Juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341 (1979), for a thorough and fascinating history of the legal
treatment of juvenile offenders before the advent of juvenile courts.
13. This concept of "'medical diagnosis and treatment" is unique to the juvenile court. F. FAUST & P.
BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES, AND COMMENTS 3 (1979).
14. Parens patriae allows a chancery court to declare a child a ward of the state if the parents were unable
or unwilling to act in the best interests of the child. S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM § 1.2 (2d ed. 1980).
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solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the court-room are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar,
can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his
side, where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to
him, the judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the
effectiveness of his work.' 5
As the juvenile system developed through the 20th century, the fissures
and faults so neatly smoothed over by this optimistic view of the treatment of
juvenile offenders opened and swallowed the ideals of its founders. Why the
system went wrong was succinctly stated by William 0. Douglas:
First, municipal budgets were not equal to the task of enticing experts to work in
the field in large numbers. Second, such experts as we had, notably the psychia-
trists and analysts, were drawn to the flesh pots receiving handsome fees for
rehabilitating the rich. Third, the love and tenderness possessed by the white-
coated judge and attendants were not sufficient to untangle the web of subcon-
cious influences that possessed the troubled youngster. Fourth, correctional insti-
tutions that were designed to care for these delinquents often became miniature
prisons with many of the same vicious aspects. Fifth, the secrecy of juvenile
proceedings led to much overreaching and arbitrary actions. Absolute power is a
heady thing even when bestowed on men of good intentions. 6
Recognizing this, the United States Supreme Court began a re-evaluation
of the juvenile system. Beginning with Haley v. Ohio7 and culminating with
In re Gault,8 the Court selectively recognized a variety of due process rights
15. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909). Little had changed by the 1940s. In
describing the operation of his court, Judge Gustav Schramm wrote:
Court sessions begin without formality....
If an attorney represents the child and his family, he is invited to enter.... Others with a
professional or objective interest-teacher, school principal, police officer, social worker, clergyman-
enter to offer what they have to the conduct of the case....
When this stage has been concluded, I usually desire to talk with the child himself. I leave the
group to enter a small room adjacent to that in which the hearing is being conducted .... At the outset
we shake hands and sit down together.... Encouraging him to talk about himself, I try to direct
attention not only to what is specifically wrong, but to the whole story .... This approach I believe is
the most effective in securing the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
Schramm, The Judge Meets the Boy and His Family, SOCIAL CORRECTIVES FOR DELINQUENCY-1945
YEARBOOK, NATIONAL PROBATION ASSOCIATION 186-88, cited in Rubin, The Juvenile Court's Search for
Identity and Responsibility, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 3 (1977).
16. Douglas, Juvenile Courts and Due Process of Law, 19 JUV. COURT JUDGES' J. 9, 11 (1968).
17. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Haley involved a 15-year old boy whose conviction for murder was based on a
confession elicited after a five-hour interrogation. The Court said, "The age of the petitioner, the hours when he
was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous
attitude of the police toward his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by
means that the law should not sanction." 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948) (Douglas, J.) (plurality opinion).
Relying on Haley, the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962) struck down the conviction for
murder handed down by a criminal court to a 14-year old boy who had been detained and interrogated for five
days without allowing his mother or counsel to visit him. In holding his confession inadmissable, the Court said,
"To allow this conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional rights." Id. at
54-55.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), was the first case in which the Court addressed the procedures
of the juvenile court itself. The Court held that a hearing for bindover to criminal court must at least follow the
essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 562.
The Court elaborated further on the "essentials" of due process in Gault by providing a laundry list of due
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to be observed in delinquency proceedings and in proceedings of juveniles
tried as adults.
In these cases, however, the Court did not address the problems of status
offenders, leaving broad questions unresolved. This lack of review was com-
pounded further by changes in state law that separated status offenders and
delinquents within the juvenile system. 9 Arguably, the Court's extension of
rights to delinquents did not apply similarly to status offenders. Gault, for
example, was confined by its language to delinquency proceedings.20 Thus,
the implications of Gault and its progeny are unclear in states that statutorily
separate delinquency and status offenses.
Added to this confusion was the wide difference of judicial views re-
flected most clearly in the Gault decision. Justices Black2' and Stewart
outlined the divergence of opinion concerning the efficacy of the juvenile
system. Black, in his concurrence, stated:
The juvenile court planners envisaged a system that would practically immunize
juveniles from "punishment" for "'crimes" in an effort to save them from youthful
indiscretions and stigmas due to criminal charges or convictions. I agree with the
Court, however, that this exalted ideal had failed of achievement since the begin-
ning of the system. 23
Justice Black advocated the effective elimination of the juvenile system by
imposing full Bill of Rights criminal safeguards instead of utilizing the due
process "fundamental fairness" standard adopted by the majority.24
Conversely, Justice Stewart, in his dissent, refused to concede that the
juvenile system was a failure and held to the classic philosophy of the juvenile
court:
Juvenile proceedings are not criminal trials. They are not civil trials. They simply
are not adversary proceedings. Whether treating with a delinquent child, a
neglected child, a defective child, or a dependent child, a juvenile proceeding's
whole purpose and mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a
prosecution in a criminal court. The object of one is the correction of a condition.
The object of the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act.25
process rights applied to juvenile hearings: written notice of charges provided sufficiently in advance of the
hearing to allow for preparation; notification to parent and child of the right to retain counsel or to have one
appointed; the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and an opportunity to cross-examine. 387
U.S. 1, 12-57 (1967).
19. Until the early 1960s, status offenders and delinquents were lumped together in every state juvenile
system. K. WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS-AMERICA'S INCARCERATED CHILDREN 37
(1976). The California statute is one example of the division now made between the types of "offenses.- CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 601-602 (West Supp. 1981). Most states have adopted this approach. SrANDARDS
supra note 6, at 74-83. But see note 7 supra.
20. 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967).
21. Id. at 59 (Black, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 78 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 60.
24. Id. at 61.
25. Id. at 78-79.
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Justice Stewart feared that turning delinquency proceedings into criminal
trials might result in a return of capital punishment for children.26 Justice
Black, on the other hand, was appalled by the fact that a child could be
"sentenced" to "what is in all but name a penitentiary" without the benefit of
the constitutional rights usually accorded criminals.27
Since Gault the Court has weaved an erratic path. It has incorporated the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof28 and the fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause29 into delinquency proceedings but refused to require
jury trials for delinquents3 This restructuring has left status offenders caught
in the middle. Juvenile court is now a quasi-criminal court, but status offen-
ders have committed no criminal offense. Instead, the status offender needs
rehabilitation. But the juvenile system is accused of being incapable of treat-
ing and curing juvenile offenders?' The result is a philosophically noncrimi-
nal, treatment-oriented system that views (and procedurally, at least, pro-
tects) the status offender as a criminal. Reconciling this dilemma is the post-
Gault juvenile court's most formidable task.
B. The Undefined Scope of Status Offenders' Constitutional Rights
1. Right to Counsel
Since juvenile proceedings are noncriminal, the sixth amendment re-
quirement of assistance of counsel does not apply.32 In Kent v. United
States,33 however, the United States Supreme Court implied that the four-
teenth amendment right to due process required the assistance of counsel in
delinquency hearings, and in Gault the Court mandated that counsel be avail-
able whenever proceedings commence that "may result in commitment to an
institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed." 34 Relying on this
limitation, some courts have found that a status offender who under state law
may not be confined is not entitled to counsel, although probation or other
sanctions may be imposed?5
Even if counsel is permitted, the value of the right may be minimal. The
Supreme Court has long held that the right is meaningless unless counsel is
effective.36 Attorneys in juvenile court, however, are faced with great ob-
26. Id. at 79-80.
27. Id. at 61.
28. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
29. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975). See also Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978), for a further
elaboration of double jeopardy rights in juvenile proceedings.
30. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should be Eliminated From Juvenile
Courts, 57 B.U.L. REV. 645, 650-56 (1977); STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 3-4.
32. See, e.g., Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964), in which the conviction and
sentencing to the Ohio state reformatory of a 17-year old boy, at an ex parte hearing, was affirmed by the Ohio
Supreme Court in a pre-Gault case.
33. 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).
34. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
35. See, e.g., In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972).
36. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
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stacles to their effectiveness. The attorney-client privilege must be tailored to
provide effective protection when the child is the accused but the parents pay
the bill, and the canon seven37 requirement of zealous representation must be
reconciled with the desire of the court to protect the "best interests of the
child.,38 The vague nature of status offense laws presents additional problems
for an attorney: "[J]udicial history does not record that anyone ever beat [a
charge of being] in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral
life." 3 9 The traditional standard for gauging the effectiveness of counsel is that
the representation must not have been so incompetent that the proceeding
becomes a farce, sham, or a mockery of justice." Although many courts
employ higher standards,' an attorney representing a status offender is so
hindered that his or her performance often will not reach even this low,
amorphous standard. In status offense cases the right to counsel often oper-
ates in a procedural sense only, because there is little of a substantive nature
that an attorney can do.
2. Vagueness
Many status offense laws are intentionally vague; to establish jurisdiction
over those children most in need of treatment the laws purposely refrain from
specifying the proscribed conduct. 42 They should be, therefore, particularly
vulnerable to due process vagueness attacks. To pass constitutional muster, a
statute must not be so indefinite that people "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. ' '43 An
unreasonably vague statute violates due process in that it fails to give fair
warning of the conduct proscribed" and gives law enforcers too much lati-
tude.!5 While vagueness is a defense most often raised in the criminal area,
vagueness principles also apply to civil laws. 6 Therefore, it is irrelevant
37. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7.
38. Viewing the lawyer's dilemma in ajuvenile case as similar to that generally raised by legal practice, the
ABA recommends that the attorney use the full arsenal of legal tools to protect the juvenile's legal rights and
interests, tempered by the unique characteristics of the client. ABA COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS, No. 1160 (1971). See In re Alonzo C., 87 Cal. App.
3d 707, 151 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1978), for an example of a fact situation in which this kind of conflict arises. The child
apparently had been sniffing paint, but the warrantless arrest and search were found invalid, resulting in a
dismissal.
39. In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 869, 870, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1979) (discussing CAL. VELF. &
INST. CODE § 601 (West 1972)); cf. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2151.022(C) & (F) (Page 1976) (proscribing conduct in
similar language).
40. See Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.Q. 1077, 1078 (1973).
41. Scott v. United States, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (standard is whether "gross incompetence
blotted out the essence of a substantial defense"); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961) (whether counsel is "'reasonably likely to render and [is] rendering reasonably
effective assistance"); State v. Merchant, 10 Md. App. 545, 550-51, 271 A.2d 752, 755 (1970) ("whether under
all the circumstances of the particular case the [defendant] was afforded genuine and effective representation").
For other standards, see Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.Q. 1077 (1973).
42. Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745,758-59(1973).
43. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
44. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
45. Id.
46. Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
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whether juvenile proceedings are classified as civil or criminal for this analy-
sis.
Vagueness attacks on status offense laws have not been well received by
the courts. Although a number of cases have reached similar results 47 two
cases merit special attention. In Commonwealth v. Brasher the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a statute allowing "stubborn children,
runaways, [and] common nightwalkers .... 49 to be imprisoned or fined.
The court set forth the elements of the crime of stubbornness as:
(a) that a person having authority to give a child under the age of eighteen lawful
and reasonable commands which such child is bound to obey gave such a com-
mand to a child; (b) that the child refused to submit to the command, and the
refusal was stubborn in the sense that it was wilful, obstinate, and persistent for a
period of time.50
In E.S.G. v. State the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas upheld a statute
defining a delinquent child as one who "habitually so deports himself as to
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others.""2 The court said,
"The relatively comprehensive word 'morals' is one which conveys concrete
impressions to the ordinary person. Such a word is in constant use in popular
parlance, and this word or words of similar import are used in the statutes of
most States to define behavior illegal for a child."
53
The decisions in Brasher and E.S.G. are justifiably attacked, not for their
results but for the way the courts reached their conclusions. In each case the
court held only that the words of the statutes were not impermissibly vague to
the judges, even though it is unthinkable that statutes couched in such terms
could apply validly to adults*4 Such legal sleight-of-hand obscures the point
implicitly made by those cases; due process for a juvenile is not the mirror
47. United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. I (D. Alaska 1956); People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256
P.2d 355 (1953); District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). But
see Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (D.C.N.Y. 1971), affd mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (striking down New
York's PINS statute as unconstitutionally vague); Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated
and remanded, 416 U.S. 918 (1974).
48. 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971).
49. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 53 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980) is no longer applicable to stubborn children
and runaways.
50. 359 Mass. 550, 555, 270 N.E.2d 389, 393 (1971).
51. 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
52. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3(f) (Vernon 1971) (repealed 1980).
53. 447 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). Referring to this paragraph, one commentator has said,
-'With all due respect, 'concrete impressions,' 'constant use in popular parlance,' and the fact that sister states
employ equally vague statutes are subjective justifications of already subjective law. It is of no utility to use
imprecision to justify an imprecise law." Roybal, Void For Vagueness: State Statutes Proscribing Conduct
Only for a Juvenile, I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 4 n.29 (1973).
54. The E.S.G. court cited no authority for its decision and, while not disagreeing with the argument in the
dissent, the majority said simply, "'[W]e disagree with [the dissent's] conclusion that [the statute] is unconstitu-
tional." 447 S.W.2d 225, 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The facts in E.S.G. are compelling. The appellant, a 14-year
old girl,
was gone from her home for days at a time and lived with a girl reputed by appellant's mother to be a
prostitute. Appellant and this girl hung around the Greyhound Bus Station and other public places. She
was brought before the Juvenile Court after her mother had located her in a downtown transient
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
image of due process for an adult. The Supreme Court in both Gault"5 and
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania6 recognized this point, but many of the critics of
status offense jurisdiction do not. Unless one is willing to contend that the
juvenile system fails completely in its goal of prevention and treatment and
that children, therefore, would be better served by treating them in the adult
criminal system, the full panoply of adult due process rights simply cannot be
applied to the juvenile system.
Status offenders and delinquents stand to lose much of their freedom
when they appear before the juvenile court, and for this reason many of the
due process rights developed for the adult system must be observed. The
uncertainty of rights such as the vagueness defense, however, does not justify
the elimination of status offense jurisdiction. In fact, elimination may exacer-
bate the problem. The most frequently suggested alternative to court jurisdic-
tion is the assignment of the problem to a social service agency. But if, for
example, a state were to assign the role of caring for runaways to a family
service bureau, the problem of vague standards would be increased as agen-
cies throughout the state developed their own standards. Courts at least are
bound by the interpretations given statutes by higher courts; bureaucracies
have no such direct checks on their daily functions. Allowing courts to define
the boundaries of juvenile due process seems by far the better course.
3. Equal Protection
Some observers claim that status offense jurisdiction results in a violation
of equal protection, either because children are treated differently from adults
or because girls are often treated differently from boys: Although the United
States Supreme Court has never addressed the equal protection claims of
status offenders, their claims may be analyzed in the following manner. The
Court has traditionally categorized statutory classifications as (1) infringe-
ments of fundamental rights58 or suspect classifications59 or (2) other classifi-
cations. Statutes in the first category are subjected to "strict scrutiny," and
will be upheld only if a "compelling state interest" is found, while those in the
apartment with a young adult male. She had been gone from home for over a week on this occasion,
and when apprehended by her mother and a policeman she was only partially dressed.... This case
history illustrates the need for a provision such as found in Sec. 3(f) [the allegedly unconstitutional
provision].
Id.
The dissent makes a well-reasoned argument based upon vagueness rules in adult cases. "Appellant here
faces confinement for almost seven years. To insist on greater definiteness in a statute imposing a $5.00 fine than
in one imposing such confinement as a sanction .... is to ignore reality." Id. at 228 (Cadena, J., dissenting).
The dissent is perhaps most accurate when it frames the issue as where "the equilibrium between the indi-
vidual's claim of freedom and society's demands upon him" is to be struck. Id. at 229. That the balance be
struck in favor of the freedom of a 14-year old girl in E.S.G.'s situation is a difficult claim to make.
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. 403 U.S. 528 (1970).
57. See Marks, Juvenile Noncriminal Misbehavior and Equal Protection, 13 FAM. L.Q. 461 (1980), for an
excellent analysis of the equal protection arguments discussed infra.
58. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1974), striking down a law as an invasion of the
fundamental right of privacy on equal protection grounds.
59. The term "suspect" was first used in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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second catagory are upheld if they have a "rational basis."60 An intermediate
level of scrutiny, sometimes called "strict rationality," has been applied in
some circumstances, most notably, sex-based discrimination cases.6
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the juvenile/adult
classification impinges on a fundamental right or involves a suspect class, or
whether it falls into other, more benign, categories. With respect to funda-
mental rights, children who have been adjudicated delinquent (or unruly in
some states)62 can be deprived of liberty. Since liberty is a fundamental right63
guaranteed by the Constitution, a compelling state interest is required to
uphold the classification.
Children also could be declared a suspect class. Although the character-
istics of a suspect class are disputed, four basic requirements can be dis-
cerned. They are that (I) the characteristic be associated with political power-
lessness, 64 (2) "the characteristic ... have a history of official and private
use for purposeful unequal treatment based on stereotypes about inherent
ability or worth," (3) "the characteristic must be birth-determined," and (4)
"the characteristic must be considered irrelevant to inherent ability or
worth. " 65 In arguing the case for juveniles as a suspect class, one commenta-
tor has said:
It is [the] position of constant and virtually complete political powerlessness that is
the most compelling reason for finding juveniles to be a suspect class. There are no
juveniles in any legislature, court, or executive authority. They cannot vote. In
these respects they are far less powerful than are blacks or women. 66
Assuming that a fundamental right is involved or that children are found
to be a suspect class, courts have had no trouble in finding a compelling state
interest in protecting children to uphold the classification.67 One author has
persuasively explained the reasoning behind these decisions:
It is abundantly clear that Americans insist that their children have unequal pro-
tection. Our local, state, and federal governments, our churches, United Ways and
social groups are all replete with subsidized programs exclusively for children's
60. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-20 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
62. One estimate states that 45-55% of the more than 66,000 juveniles confined in state institutions are
status offenders. M. REETOR, PINS: AN AMERICAN SCANDAL (1974), citedin STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 6.
However, because many commentators tend to regard any form of residential placement, whether a group
home, training school, or adult prison, as "'institutionalization," these numbers are open to doubt.
63. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Court upheld the World War I
internment of Japanese-Americans by finding a compelling state interest. See also Marks, Juvenile Noncriminal
Misbehavior and Equal Protection, 13 FAM. L.Q. 461, 470 (1980).
64. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
65. Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L.
REV. 462, 474-75 (1977).
66. Marks, Juvenile Noncriminal Misbehavior and Equal Protection, 13 FAM. L.Q. 461, 481 (1980) (foot-
note omitted).
67. See, e.g., Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd mem., 535
F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976) (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
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needs.... Children have special needs to cope with infancy and adolescence;
they need unequal protection.68
The argument that children qua children are denied equal protection of the
laws thus has met with little success. The claim that status offense laws treat
boys differently from girls, however, has been received more warmly, and
courts have struck down status offense statutes that explicitly discriminated
against girls. For example, a New York statute that allowed confinement of
girls for status offenses until their eighteenth birthday, while allowing boys to
be held only until their sixteenth birthday, was struck down in 1972.69 At least
in cases in which the discrimination is explicit, precedent exists for an equal
protection argument.
Today, however, it is the implicit discriminatory effect of status offense
laws that receives the most attention.70 Girls are far more likely to be ensnared
in the juvenile system on the basis of "sexual misconduct" or "endangering
morals" sections7' than are boys. 72 This effect has led one commentator, after
discussing vagueness problems, to remark:
The overbreadth and vagueness of the [status offense] statutes give rise to a
situation ripe for discriminatory enforcement against female juveniles. By virtue of
the nature of the American culture and its view of sex roles, the same behavior
which goes unpunished in males may subject females to extended periods of
confinement. The fact that the statutes create a great potential for discrimination
and, in addition, unconstitutionally punish a status, should be enough to condemn
them. 73
This discriminatory enforcement of status offense laws is easily ex-
plained but difficult to defend. One writer has remarked that those making
these claims "refuse to recognize that [discriminatory enforcement] might
result from a parent's greater concern for her naive young daughter who is
running loose than for her Tom Sawyer who is 'just being a boy.' -74 To
accept this explanation, one must accept as well that parental whims and
wishes should be allowed to control the enforcement of laws. Further, even if
one accepts this premise, it is hard to argue that the law should be used to
68. Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L. REV. 631, 641 (1977). In an earlier
article Judge Arthur wrote: -'Should children be as equal as people? Certainly not. They should not have equal
liberty; they should have less. Neither should they have equal protection-they should have more. How much
less and how much more will depend on the maturity of the particular child at the particular time.- Arthur,
Should Children Be as Equal as People?, 45 N.D.L. REV. 204, 221 (1969) (footnote and emphasis omitted).
69. In re Patricia A., 39 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972). Similar statutes have been
struck down on equal protection grounds. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 57 III. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (based
on a state equal rights amendment). But see State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div.),
appeal denied, 154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 209 (1969).
70. See Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Laws: Juvenile Women and the Double Standard of Morality, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 313 (1971).
71. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(C) (Page 1979).
72. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 40.
73. Comment, Juvenile Delinquency Laws: Juvenile Women and the Double Standard of Morality, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 313, 341 (1971).
74. Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L. REV. 631, 642 (1977).
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institutionalize a double standard of morality. Double standards, however,
are legion in our society, and although they may disappear from the letter of
law, they will remain part of its application until they are forced out by
constitutional interpretation.
C. The Difference Between Status Offenders and Delinquents
Implicit in the controversy surrounding status offenders is the notion that
they are somehow different from their delinquent counterparts. Delinquents,
having committed what would be a criminal offense, are assumed to be more
dangerous and anti-social than a child who merely runs from home. But this
assumption is specious in two respects. First, the psychological development
and offense history of status offenders differ little from those of delinquents.75
Second, some states allow a court to find a repeat status offender guilty of the
delinquent offenses of probation violation or contempt of court and thereby
"bootstrap" a status offender into a delinquent.76 Thus, the legal distinction
between status offenses and delinquency is made irrationally.
1. The Non-Legal Distinctions Between Delinquents
and Status Offenders
Recent studies of children exposed to juvenile court have concluded that
status offenders do not constitute a class recognizable either by offense his-
tory or by personality pattern. One study7 analyzed the subsequent judicial
contacts of over two thousand children who had appeared before two Virginia
courts over a four year period. The researcher concluded:
The findings of this [study] provide little or no support for those who have
argued that status offenders are a distinctively different group of juveniles. To the
contrary, with relatively minor exceptions, the findings indicate that many of
those who appear [as status offenders] have previously appeared for quite differ-
ent types of offenses and that those whose initial appearance involved a status
offense frequently returned for other types of alleged misconduct. 78
A second study analyzed the results of psychological tests administered
to juveniles segregated into five groups based on adjudication (status offender
or delinquent) and disposition (probation, group home placement, institu-
tionalization)79 The results showed that delinquents placed in a group home,
institutionalized delinquents, and status offenders sent home on probation all
showed "moderate rebellion and.., anti-social acting out,"80 while delin-
quents sent home on probation showed the least pathological adjustment.
75. See notes 77-85 and accompanying text infra.
76. See notes 86-93 and accompanying text infra.
77. Thomas, Are Status Offenders Really So Different?, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 438 (1976).
78. Id. at 454.
79. Marra and Sax, Personality Patterns and Offense Histories of Status Offenders and Delinquents, 29
JUV. AND FAM. COURT J. 27 (1978).
80. Id. at 29.
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Surprisingly, the status offenders placed in group homes displayed the most
deviant personalities. These results, it was concluded, "clearly [reflect] the
large overlap between the personalities of adjudicated delinquents and [status
offenders].", 81 The same researchers also focused on the offense histories of
children in juvenile court. They concluded that status offenders were more
likely to return to court than were delinquents, and when status offenders
returned, they were "just as likely" to return for a delinquent act as those
originally adjudicated delinquent.82
A third study measured the reliability of the commission of status of-
fenses as an indication of subsequent delinquent behavior.83 These re-
searchers found that adolescents who engaged in status offenses also engaged
in small theft (shoplifting) and in the use and sale of drugs but did not engage
in more serious forms of delinquency. Further, status offenders and non-
status offenders did not differ in their rate of serious delinquency!,
These studies paint a rather startling picture. Many status offenders seem
to have more in common with relatively less serious delinquent offenders than
with those who commit more serious delinquent acts. Conversely, status
offenders who are removed from home are psychologically more similar to
institutionalized delinquents than either status offenders or delinquents
placed on probation. Finally, the high percentage of first-time status offenders
who return on delinquency charges, coupled with the finding that status
offenders who are removed from home display the most pathological de-
velopment, indicates that many status offenders need more help than delin-
quents, not less.85
2. The Blurry Legal Distinction Between
Status Offenders and Delinquents
In some jurisdictions a status offender who repeats an offense can be
charged with the delinquent offenses of probation violation, contempt of
court, or in the case of a status offender placed outside the home who subse-
quently runs away, escape.8 6 Thus, a runaway who is returned home on
81. Id.
82. Id. at 30.
83. LeBlanc and Biron, Status Offenses: Legal Term Without Meaning, 17 J. RESEARCH CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 114 (1980).
84. Id. at 119, 121.
85. Of course, not all studies have found the status offender/delinquent dichotomy to be meaningless. See,
e.g., Clarke, Status Offenders Are Different: A Comparison of Offender Careers by Type of First Known
Offense, 12 J. RESEARCH CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 51 (1975).
86. As of 1975, the state codes of California, Nevada, North Carolina, and Ohio were the only ones to allow
a status offender to be ajudicated delinquent for violating a court order. Sarri, Status Offenders: Their Fate in
the Juvenile Justice System, in STATUS OFFENDERS: AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM-AN AN-
THOLOGY 61,62 (Allinson ed. 1978). Two states retain these provisions. NEV. REV. SrAT. § 62.040(c)(2) (1979);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.02(B) (Page 1976). Since 1975, California and North Carolina have removed




probation and later runs again can return to court on a delinquency charge
even though he has committed the same act that originally was chargeable
solely as a status offense.
In light of state statutory revisions providing for separate treatment of
status offenders and delinquents, however, the trend is definitely against such
"bootstrapping." For example, the use of contempt of court as a way to
upgrade a status offender to a delinquent was recently disallowed in Califor-
nia.87 While acknowledging that "[p]lacing a runaway in a nonsecure environ-
ment is something of an exercise in futility, "8 the court found that the intent
of the legislature in redrafting the juvenile code was to separate status offen-
ders and delinquents. 89 In other states, similar juvenile code interpretations
have disallowed a finding of delinquency for escape9 and probation viola-
tion.9'
Nevertheless, a few state courts have sanctioned bootstrapping in recent
cases. For example, a North Carolina appeals court has indicated that proba-
tion violation could give rise to a delinquency charge,92 and the Alaska
Supreme Court has found that a chronic runaway was guilty of criminal con-
tempt and therefore delinquent? 3 Thus, a basic philosophical inconsistency
remains in the law of several state juvenile systems.
D. Summary
The problems discussed above are only the most severe and cause the
most injustice and abuse within the juvenile system. Other commentators
have pointed to additional ones: the fact that a criminal stigma attaches to all
those going before the juvenile court regardless of the charge;94 a perceived
imposition on the family of the state's will and the resulting belief that the
state unwarrantably intrudes into family life; 95 and the fact that the juvenile
system is required at times to spend its limited resources on a child who is
merely acting out instead of one deemed to really need the service.96 Viewed
87. In re Ronald S., 69 Cal. App. 3d 866, 138 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1977).
88. Id. at 872, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
89. See also State ex rel. Bellanger, 357 So. 2d 634 (La. Ct. App. 1978), in which the court "reluctantly"
disallowed using contempt as a basis for finding a violation of probation, based on a 1975 revision of the
Louisiana juvenile code and the "fundamental principle that the punishment for contempt [cannot] exceed that
given in the original hearing." Id. at 636. In re Baker, 71111. 2d 480, 376 N.E.2d 1005 (1978), held that, undernew
Illinois law, ajuvenile who runs from placement may be found in contempt, but that contempt may not be used
as a basis for a delinquency adjudication.
90. See People ex rel. M.S., 73 N.J. 238, 374 A.2d 445 (1977); In re E.A.R., 548 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977).
91. See People ex rel. D.R. v. E.R. and J.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971).
92. In re Frye, 32 N.C. App. 384, 232 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
93. L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
94. See Gough, Beyond Control in the Juvenile Court, in BEYOND CONTROL 271,272 (L. Teitelbaum & A.
Gough, eds. 1977); Orlando and Black, Classification in Juvenile Court: The Delinquent Child and the Child in
Need of Supervision, JUv. JUST., May, 1974, at 13, 19 (1974).
95. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 11-12. Contra, Gregory, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Over Noncriminal
Misbehavior: The Argument Against Abolition, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 242, 263-67 (1978).
96. Quinn and Hutchinson, Status Offenders Should be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 7 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 923, 930-32 (1980).
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as a whole, all these problems present a powerful indictment of the juvenile
justice system's treatment of status offenders.
II. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
In response to these problems, many commentators have called for the
abolition of status offense jurisdiction97 or the abolition of the entire juvenile
court system.98 A proposal by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the
American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbe-
havior,99 is among those calling for the abolition of status offense jurisdic-
tion."° To deal with the problems of runaways the commission proposed that
the child be allowed to choose his own place of residence if he does not want
to go home, so long as his choice does not "imperil" him and the placement is
in a "suitable family setting."'0 ' The proposal almost totally ignores the par-
ents' wishes; if the child and the parents cannot agree on placement, the
child's wishes prevail unless the above conditions are not met.'02
Under the proposal the court would no longer be allowed to compel
attendance at school because truancy "is properly the business of the
schools, not the courts."'0 3 To "promote" attendance, the Standards
recommend educational counseling, alternative educational programs, "es-
cort" services provided by the school or community, and "various programs
involving the parents."'T 4 For children in conflict with their families, the
Standards recommend a "broad spectrum of services"' 05 that "should be
offered on a voluntary basis, and the juvenile and the family should not be
required to receive such services in cases involving the juvenile's unruly
behavior which does not contravene the criminal law."'
6
A proposal by Saul Rubin,'0 7 published the year before the IJA/ABA
Commission finished its tentative draft, also suggests elimination of status
offense jurisdiction.0  Rubin proposes that juvenile courts have jurisdiction
over delinquents and over "any child who is in a situation subjecting him to
97. Gough and Grilli, Unruly Child and the Law, JUV. JUST., Nov. 1972, at 9; Kaufman, Of Juvenile
Justice and Injustice, 62 A.B.A.J. 730 (1976); Ketcham, Why Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should Be
Eliminated From Juvenile Courts, 57 B.U.L. REV. 645 (1977); National Council on Crime and Delinquency,
Jurisdiction Over Status Offenders Should be Removed from the Juvenile Court-A Policy Statement, 21
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 97 (1975).
98. See, e.g., Guggenheim, Abolishing the Juvenile Justice System, TRIAL, Jan. 1979, at 23; McCarthy,
Should Juvenile Delinquency be Abolished?, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 196 (1977).
99. STANDARDS, supra note 6.
100. Id. § 1.1.
101. Id. §§ 5.1, 5.4(C)(2).
102. Id.
103. Id. § 1.1, at 38.
104. Id. § 1.1, at 39.
105. Id. § 4. 1.
106. Id. § 4.2.
107. S. RUBIN, LAW OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (1976).
108. Rubin writes: "The result of giving jurisdiction over noncriminal behavior to thejuvenile court is that
a disproportionate share of available resources is applied to children who pose no criminal danger to society-
while.., many serious juvenile offenders are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction or are transferred by the
court to criminal court." Id. at 12.
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serious physical harm, or who is in clear and present danger of suffering
lasting or permanent damage."109 However, his proposal is more vague than
current court jurisdictional laws, and it is doubtful that the proposal would
reach the goal of the elimination of status offenses. Courts easily could find
that a status offender is "in clear and present danger of suffering lasting or
permanent damage" if they so desired.
However, although both proposals are somewhat vulnerable to criticism,
the philosophy behind them is not so easy to dismiss. Each proposal works
from a particular view of the abilities and knowledge of the child. Rubin
rejects the notion that the minor needs the doctrine of parens patriae to
protect his every interest:
The assumption of the common law, of all juvenile court law, of the [Sitandard
[Juvenile Court] [Alct of 1959, of parens patriae, is that children are incompetent
and that their parents, and behind them the state or its agencies (such as schools,
juvenile institutions, and welfare departments) should control them. The parallel
assumption is that juvenile courts exist to enforce all this. 10
The Standards echo this outlook:
The juvenile court's jurisdiction over unruly children is bottomed on the assump-
tion-most often implicit-that parents are reasonable persons seeking proper
ends, that youthful independence is malign, that the social good requires judicial
power to backstop parental command and that.., coercive intervention will
effectively remedy family-based problems and deter future offense.'
Indeed, it cannot be claimed that all children are incompetent, nor that all
parents are reasonable persons. A status offender may be and often is acting
out against unreasonable and inflexible parents or teachers who do not under-
stand his needs or problems. When this occurs, however, effective help is
required by the child or the family to prevent long-term damage to the child.
Only a court, guided by due process and an overriding concern for the best
interests of the child, can require that such help be made available to the child
or family in a manner that is consistent and fair. Voluntary services have their
place, and indeed are indispensible in a family service plan, but for those
unable or unwilling to recognize their own problems, voluntary services are
not enough. The solution to the juvenile justice problem, therefore, requires
something other than elimination of status jurisdiction.
HI. PROPOSED JURISDICTION
The following proposal proceeds on these premises. Most status of-
fenders need help, and society needs to have its status offenders helped.
Relinquishing jurisdiction over those children whose behavior becomes so
unacceptable that parents or community feel that outside intervention is
109. Id. at 44.
110. Id. at 36.
111. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 3.
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needed effectively abandons thousands of children and families with real and
serious problems.
Coerced intervention might work; voluntary intervention often will not.
When a family's situation becomes so intolerable that a child must run away,
when school becomes so uninteresting that the child stops going, or when
parents so lose control over their child that he does as he pleases without
adult guidance, effective, wide-ranging help is required. Moreover, merely
asking a child and parents to attend counseling seldom works; in most cases
each party blames the other and does not recognize any fault in himself.
Most status offenders differ little from most delinquents except in the
eyes of the law. A child who runs from home by hitchhiking to the next state
differs little from the child who runs to the next county in his parents' car. A
child who disrupts class by fighting or with violent outbursts of temper differs
little from one who manifests his displeasure by throwing rocks through the
windows. A child found intoxicated by glue and alcohol is in no better shape
than one found intoxicated by shoplifted glue and alcohol. This is not to say
that all of these children have the same problems or can be treated the same;
to the contrary, each child is an individual who deserves special, individua-
lized help. Labeling one a status offender and the other a delinquent does not,
however, make the distinctions necessary to provide that help.
Coercive intervention in the lives of children does work."2 Placing a
troubled child in a group home and ordering him to stay there can have an
enormously beneficial impact on that child. Getting a child out of the natural
home can often buy the time needed for a child to realize his problems and get
himself straightened out.
Juvenile court is the institution that should administer juvenile services.
Juvenile court can act as a "traffic cop," directing children to the service
suited to their needs with at least as much uniformity of standards as a non-
judicial agency, and it can compel the child's attendance at the service.
Allowing a nonjudicial body to adjudicate and dispose ofjuvenile cases would
multiply the problems of arbitrary standards and exacerbate the lack of
procedural safeguards.
112. See R. MOSELEY, KNOCK ON OUR DOOR 5, 11-12 (1979):
Since we opened in 1968, we have been "*Mom," "'Dad," and "'Sister" to 164 girls, and while our
record isn't perfect, nearly eight out often have made their way in the world without continuing their
life sentence on the installment plan in our expensive and often damaging penal system.
We don't always suceed with our girls. Even when we are selective-and interview candidates to
make sure they want to come to [the group home] and will benefit by our program-we sometimes fail.
Ours is not a panacea that will salvage every girl who is troubled or in trouble. But of those who come
to us nearly [80%] grow up to lead useful, productive, crime-free lives. They find jobs, marry, raise
children and come back to visit us, some after they have been on their own for ten years. No matter
how challenging some days are, the calls, letters, and visits we get from our girls who have grown up
and are succeeding make it all worthwhile.
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It is proposed that jurisdiction statutes be rewritten in pertinent part in
the following manner:
Section I. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction. The juvenile court has exclusive origi-
nal jurisdiction in cases concerning any child alleged to be a child in need of
treatment, an abused child, a neglected child, or a dependent child. A child in need
of treatment is any child who
(A) either (I) violates any law of this state, the United States, or any ordinance
or regulation of a political subdivision of the state, which would be a crime if
committed by an adult; (2) is habitually truant from school or home without
his/her parents' permission; or (3) does not subject himself/herself to the rea-
sonable control of his/her parents, teachers, custodian, or guardian by reason of
being habitually disobedient; and
(B) is found by the court to be in need of the rehabilitative resources of the
juvenile court.
Section II. Disposition of a Child in Need of Treatment. If the child is found to
be a child in need of treatment, the court may make any of the following orders of
disposition:
(A) return the child home subject to whatever conditions or limitations the court
may prescribe;
(B) place the child on probation subject to whatever conditions or limitations the
court may prescribe;
(C) require the child to attend counseling, or make use of other helping services
available in the community;
(D) place the child in the temporary or permanent custody of a non-secure
home, camp, school, or other such residential facility;
(E) commit the child to a secure facility operated by [the state division of youth],
but only if the court makes an independent finding that (1) other dispositional
options will not be suitable for the child's needs and problems, and (2) the child
is so dangerous that he/she must be isolated from the community for his/her
own protection or the protection of the community; or
(F) make such further dispositions as the court finds proper, so long as the child
is not placed in a secure residential facility.
The effects and characteristics of this proposal are as follows. Due
process safeguards, as defined by the United States Supreme Court for the
juvenile court, will be imposed on all hearings for children alleged to be in
need of treatment, because in each case the child may be deprived of liberty
by placement outside the home.
The artificial status offender/delinquent dichotomy is erased, and is re-
placed by a more meaningful less-serious offender/serious offender distinc-
tion. In effect, this system would separate those coming before the juvenile
court into three groups: those not requiring intervention (that is, those not
found to be in need of the rehabilitative resources of the juvenile court), those
requiring a relatively low level of intervention, and those requiring separation
from the community. The first group would contain those juveniles whose
actions should be characterized as childish acting out devoid of any substan-
tial signs of serious long-range problems. This change would remove from the
system those children whose actions, though possibly destructive or anti-
social, do not warrant the court's spending its limited resources on them.
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Thus, the actions of some children who engage in minor vandalism, skip
school once or twice, or break curfew occasionally would be viewed as the
price society pays for youthful independence.
The second group, those requiring help but not segregation, would com-
prise the bulk of cases before the court and thus would be afforded the widest
range of dispositional alternatives. Whatever is required for the child's needs
and within the means of the court, from probation to removal from the com-
munity by placement in a non-secure residential facility, would be made
available.
The third group, those whose acts are so dangerous that the community
needs to be protected from them, is the only one that could be placed in a
secure facility. Children could not be placed there to punish them for running
from a prior placement or because there is no place else to put them. By
definition, a child who is solely a chronic runaway or school truant will never
be institutionalized because those acts can never be so dangerous that society
needs to be protected from the child. Further, the dangerous child will be kept
out of placements with less seriously troubled children, thus avoiding the
problem of group homes becoming "crime schools" and allowing non-secure
facilities to function properly.
This proposal allows the maximum possible degree of diversion. It
recognizes that help that is voluntarily sought is better than no help but also
that help which is imposed often is better than no help at all. Thus, if a child
can be diverted into non-coercive treatment, by definition he will not be
brought into the system because he will not be "in need of the rehabilitative
resources of the juvenile court."'"13 Juvenile courts already divert a majority
of the children coming before them,"4 and only those who cannot be helped in
any other way should be within the ambit of the courts' coercive power.
This proposal reconciles to an extent the condition-oriented philosophy
of the juvenile court with the procedural safeguards of the adult criminal
court. Every child will be afforded the procedural safeguards currently re-
quired solely in delinquency proceedings. The attorney representing a child
charged with what was a status offense is given a more important and better-
113. The "need of treatment' requirement, while seemingly innocuous, is a statutory requirement in only a
few states and a judicial requirement in others. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343, 38 S.E.2d 444.
447 (1946):
To classify an infant as delinquent because of a youthful prank, or for a mere single violation of a
misdemeanor statute or municipal ordinance, not immoral per se .... is offensive to our sense of
justice and to the intendment of the law. We cannot reconcile ourselves to the thought that the
incautious violation of a motor vehicle traffic law, a single act of truancy, or a departure from an
established rule of similar slight gravity is sufficient to justify the classification of the offender as a
"delinquent"....
See also M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974); Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d
756 (1969); In re David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1971); UNIFORM JUVENILE
COURT ACT § 2(3), 29(b).
114. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9-16 (1967). Three major methods of
diversion are used: police station adjustment, planned diversion to other social agencies, and unofficial court
handling of cases. See Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L. REV. 631,632 (1977).
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defined role since the state must prove not only that the child is "habitually"
disobedient or truant but also that the child is in need of treatment. The
proposal is relatively specific, yet it encompasses most types of behavior that
the juvenile court seeks to control. Sexual conduct by girls still may result in
sanctions when none are imposed on boys, but this is more a function of the
administration of the law than of the substantive content of the law itself.
IV. CONCLUSION
While not a radical change in the present structure, the proposed restruc-
turing of the juvenile court's jurisdiction is calculated to redress, at least
partially, the problems of status offense jurisdiction. Although "unruly child
cases are usually among the most intractable and difficult matters with which
the juvenile court has to deal,"" 5 it also must be understood that the problems
of the status offender can lead to a lifetime of other, more serious problems if
not addressed promptly and effectively" 6 This proposed change in the juris-
diction of the juvenile court, coupled with effective dispositional alternatives,
represents one way in which the law can help the status offender.
Kurt Erlenbach
115. STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 4.
116. See STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 3-4: "Most defiance of parents and other forms of noncriminal
misbehavior-troublesome though they are-represent a youthful push for independence and are both endemic
and transitory. They are at worst transitional deviance that is outgrown." Whether the authors of the
STANDARDS would consider the problems of E.S.G., supra note 54, to be a "youthful push for independence"
is unknown.
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